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COMPETITION AND REGULATION:
CHARLES RIVER BRIDGE
RECROSSED
Donald I. Bakert
The American economy at large relies on competition, en-
forced by the antitrust laws, to serve as its regulator. The goal is to
encourage efficiency and low prices and to hold economic power in
check. Competition is thus accepted as "our fundamental national
economic policy,"' and the Sherman Act as "the Magna Carta of
free enterprise."' Antitrust law rests on the premise, eloquently
stated by Mr. Justice Black, that
the unrestrained interaction of competitive forces will yield the
best allocation of our economic resources, the lowest prices, the
highest quality and the greatest material progress, while at the
same time providing an environment conducive to the preserva-
tion of our democratic political and social institutions. 3
Competition also has the additional virtue, not stressed here, of
being able to adjust automatically and swiftly to changing public
demands and business opportunities-an especially important
value in an age of accelerating change.
At least two basic types of situations require resort to some
form of direct government regulation. The first involves a "natural
monopoly," where competition simply would not work in economic
t Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, United States Department of
Justice; Visiting Professor of Law, Cornell Law School (Spring 1974). A.B. 1957, Princeton
University; B.A. in Law 1959, University of Cambridge; LL.B. 1961, Harvard University.
The views stated here are those of the author, and do not necessarily represent those of the
Department of Justice.
The author gratefully acknowledges the research assistance and friendly advice of his
Antitrust Division colleagues Kenneth G. Robinson and Edward Walton.
United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 372 (1963).
2 United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972).
3 Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958).
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terms-in other words, where the economies of scale are so perva-
sive that direct competition becomes an idle gesture. The local
distribution of gas, electricity, and telephone communication offers
the principal case in point. Here regulation is intended to secure
the classic marketplace goals of keeping costs and prices down.4
The second type of situation occurs where competition does
not secure some specifically defined social goals, as in banking5 and
securities regulation. 6 The avoidance of widespread bank failure is
accepted as an overriding social goal, because widespread failures
are highly disruptive and losses traditionally fall on innocent de-
positors. Similarly, the issuance and trading of securities is regu-
lated to ensure full disclosure and fairness to the investing public,
and continued confidence in the capital markets. Regulatory
supervision can be directed to these specific goals. Neither scheme
implies a general elimination of competition. Indeed, the Supreme
Court underscored the point in 1963, when it said that
[t]he fact that banking is a highly regulated industry critical to
the Nation's welfare makes the play of competition not less
important but more so.... [I]f the costs of banking services and
credit are allowed to become excessive by the absence of competi-
tive pressures, virtually all costs, in our credit economy, will be
affected .... 7
In theory, "the basic goal of direct governmental regulation
through administrative bodies and the goal of indirect governmen-
tal regulation in the form of antitrust law is the same-to achieve
the most efficient allocation of resources possible."8 In fact, regula-
tion has been used to thwart economic efficiency in many instances.
The Council of Economic Advisers, among others, has made this
point clear:
4 See, e.g., Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1970); Federal Power Act, 16
U.S.C. § 797 (1970).
1 See Federal Deposit insurance Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1811-32 (1970), as amended (Supp.
III, 1973).
6 See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78hh-1 (1970).
r United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 372 (1963). This decision put
to rest the lingering question of whether the antitrust laws applied to commercial banking. It
held that in § 7 of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970)) antimerger provisions barred a
merger of two of the three largest banks in Philadelphia, despite the prior approval of that
merger by the Comptroller of the Currency under the Bank Merger Act of 1960. 12 U.S.C.
§ 1828(c) (1970).
8 Northern Natural Gas Co. v. FPC, 399 F.2d 953, 959 (D.C. Cir. 1968). Here the court
found that the FPC had ignored significant anticompetitive effects in permitting a joint
venture among several American gas companies to construct and operate an entirely new
gas pipeline across the Northern Great Lakes States.
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Regulation has too often resulted in protection of the status quo.
[C]hange of any kind becomes hard to justify and even
harder to allow when some affected group can claim immediate
harm, whereas the potential beneficiaries are widely diffused and
usually not represented. Yet innovation and adaptation are the
dynamics of economic progress.
There is no clear safeguard against these dangers, but more
reliance on economic incentives and market mechanisms in regu-
lated industries would be a step forward. .... Industries have
been more progressive when the agencies have endeavored to
confine regulation to a necessary minimum and have otherwise
fostered competition. 9
The thwarting of economic progress is due to a variety of
factors, including the politics, psychology, and practicalities which
surround the regulatory process. The problem is made worse by
statutory mandates which allow-or encourage-anticompetitive
regulatory measures. Clearly, the existing regulatory realities' must
be appraised. What direct government regulation can do well and
what it cannot do well must be ascertained so that more realistic
statutory rules can be formulated in response.
I
THE INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT
The regulatory commission is a unique American contribu-
tion to the history of public institutions. It reflects a faith in
government by law, using open, orderly processes which can be
reviewed by a court. It reflects a populist concern about robber
barons and bigness, combined with an understandable public reluc-
tance to have government assume broad business functions. It
reflects the hope that a body of independent experts could solve
problems which the legislature and general public found too
difficult to solve themselves.
Regulators frequently are given very little statutory guidance
about how to handle their jobs. This reflects a variety of political
realities. Much economic regulation is the product of actual or
imagined crises; it therefore reflects the understandable political
desire to do something, even if no one is quite sure exactly what must
be done. A clear example of this phenomenon is the key federal
9 Council of Economic Advisers, Annual Report, in ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT
107-08 (1970).
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regulatory schemes which arose out of the profound economic
crisis of the 1930's, including the regulation of trucking, airlines,
banking, broadcasting, common carrier communications, and se-
curities markets. Crisis politics tends to produce generalized
schemes in which the difficult accommodation of fundamental
values is not defined and in which key questions are ignored or left
for some future regulator to resolve under a very general
mandate. 10
The traditional regulatory statute thus enjoins the agency to
make a broad set of decisions on the basis of a very general
injunction to serve the "public interest." Under this formula, reg-
ulators are frequently authorized to fix prices, exclude entry, and
deal with any other competitive evil which may come up. Reg-
ulators tend to like it this way; open-ended authority gives them
maximum flexibility to do what they think best. But, moreover, this
situation is often not unpopular with the regulated firms, an
important political fact because such firms generally prefer regula-
tion to open competition.11 The pressure is ever present for broad,
open-ended regulatory mandates, with full authority to suppress
competition.
Fortunately, a series of recent appellate court decisions has
made clear that an agency must consider antitrust questions even
under the general "public interest" standard. 12 Agencies have often
resisted this approach, but lost. For example, in 1973, the Supreme
Court, in Gulf States Utilities Co. v. FPC,13 criticized the Federal
Power Commission for its failure to consider antitrust issues in
connection with the financing of an electric utility. The Court
emphasized that the regulatory agency's "[c]onsideration of anti-
'0 The problem of excessively broad administrative discretion was recognized by legal
scholars during the 1930's. In 1938 Professor Felix Frankfurter, as he then was, explained
this central problem as follows:
The legislature will delegate power when it is so simple or so mechanical that it can
leave it to somebody else; or, on the other extreme, when it is so complicated that
the legislature cannot define it, where it takes care of a thousand variegated
situations. In this situation you have the seed of the central problem of administra-
tive law, namely, the conflict between rule and discretion. Out of that come most of
our specific problems ....
Frankfurter, Summation of the Conference, 24 A.B.A.J. 282, 284 (1938). A major "specific
problem" has proven to be administrative agency handling of competitive questions.
I See Baxter, NYSE Fixed Commission Rates: A Private Cartel Goes Public, 22 STAN. L. REV.
675 (1970). See also note 56 infra.
12 Gulf States Util. Co. v. FPC, 411 U.S. 747 (1973); Federal Maritime Comm'n v.
Aktiebolaget Svenska Amerika Linien (Swedish Am. Line), 390 U.S. 238 (1968); Denver &
Rio Grande W. Ry. v. United States, 387 U.S. 485 (1967); Northern Natural Gas Cd. v. FPC,
399 F.2d 953 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
13 411 U.S. 747 (1973).
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trust and anticompetitive issues... serves the important function of
establishing a first line of defense against those competitive prac-
tices that might later be the subject of antitrust proceedings."' 4
This line of cases does narrow the agency discretion somewhat:
agencies can no longer ignore antitrust questions altogether. But
they are not given affirmative guidance as to how they are to weigh
competitive values against other interests; thus, they may still
slough off competition in the balancing process. 15
Affirmative guidance is needed because competition is very
much at odds with the traditional regulatory mentality. Competi-
tion is simply a tool for promoting economic efficiency. It recog-
nizes that most commercial endeavors require skill and judgment,
and that these are affirmative values which cannot be commanded by
the state.' 6 Instead, it seeks to provide a framework which encour-
ages private effort, with rewards for the innovator and the cost-
cutter, and penalties for the laggards.
In contrast, regulation operates in an environment of govern-
ment commands and bureaucratic negotiation. At best, it seeks to
prohibit bad things, such as monopoly pricing, in the hope of
thereby promoting good. The watchword of the process is caution:
new ideas must be scrutinized carefully and all interests protected.
Efficiency may be encouraged, but profits often turn on the
regulator's judgment of a 'just" rate of return; and rate-of-return
regulation has sometimes penalized efficient firms with lower rate
bases over less efficient firms with higher rate bases.1 7 The process
tends to be shot through with subtle and elaborate cross-subsidies.
For example, in transportation, high-valued cargoes subsidize low-
14 I& at 760.
15 For example, in Northern Lines Merger Cases, 396 U.S. 491 (1970), the Court
upheld an ICC approval of a large railroad merger almost identical to one which had been
declared illegal over half a century earlier in a leading antitrust decision, Northern Sec. Co.
v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904).
16 This point has of course been long recognized by courts of equity. See Lumley v.
Wagner, 42 Eng. Rep. 687 (Ch. 1852). In that case the Lord Chancellor declined to order
specific performance by the defendant opera singer over a contract with the plaintiff,
because "I have not the means of compelling her to sing." Id. at 693 (emphasis added).
Instead, he prohibited her from singing for others during the term of the contract. For an
example of the failure of a regnlatory agency to command success-and implicit recognition
of that failure-see Investigation into Limitations of Carrier Service on C.O.D. and
Freight-Collect Shipments, Ex parte 272, 343 I.C.C. 692 (1973). See also Western Union: The
Reluctant Messenger, 120 CONG. REc. H9268 (daily ed. Sept. 16, 1974) (remarks of Rep.
Rosenthal); A Cure for the Postal Problem, 120 CONG. REc. E4555 (daily ed. July 9, 1974)
(remarks of Rep. Crane).
17 Averich & Johnson, Behavior of the Firm Under Regulatory Constraint, AM. ECON. REv.
1052, 1052-69 (1962). See also Wellisz, Regulation of Natural Gas Pipeline Companies: An
Economics Analysis, 71 J. POL. ECON. 30, 30-43 (1963).
1975]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
valued cargoes, and in telephone and electricity regulation, com-
mercial users, who do not vote, tend to subsidize residential users,
who do.
The regulator tends to assume that by combining command
and cajolery, he can achieve close to optimum results. Yet experi-
ence suggests important examples to the contrary: cases wherein
regulators have been unable to prevent failure by management, as
in the cases of the Penn Central Railroad and the Franklin Na-
tional Bank. More important are the broader cases wherein reg-
ulators have been plainly unable to command success. This point is
made clear by national experience in the field of passenger rail
transportation. For years the government required reluctant rail-
roads to run passenger trains that they wished to abandon. It could
not require them, however, to run trains that the public wanted to
ride on-trains that were prompt, clean, and pleasant. In the end,
the government had to take this function over for itself in most of
the country.18
Competition is, of course, highly disruptive to the regulatory
environment described above. It undermines subtle cross-subsidy
schemes, and substitutes the consumers' judgment of what they
want to buy for the regulator's judgment of what they ought to
have. And, competition is particularly disruptive of the close work-
ing relationship between regulator and regulated-the environ-
ment of negotiation and trade-off' 9 -because it deprives the reg-
ulator of the customary "carrots" for inducing compliance with his
particular desires.20
Competition raises its awkward head in several types of regula-
tory situations. The first involves new entries and new ways of
performing old functions. The second involves acquisitions and
mergers of regulated firms. The third involves specific restrictive
business arrangements which are arguably needed to comply with
the basic regulatory mandate. Each of these situations requires the
regulator to consider competition and generally to weigh it against
other values.
The regulator's task is not easy. Monopolists rarely welcome
intrusions from the marketplace, and regulated monopolists are no
exception. They can usually be counted on to argue strongly
18 Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970, 45 U.S.C. §§ 501-644 (1970). This statute
provided for, inter alia, creation of Amtrak, a quasi-public corporation which was authorized
to take over passenger service and equipment from the nation's railroads.
19 See, e.g., Baxter, supra note 11; Note, Informal Bargaining Process: An Analysis of the
SEC's Regulation of the New York Stock Exchange, 80 YALE L.J. 811 (1971).
20 See A. BuRNs, THE DECLINE OF COMPETITION 520 (1936).
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against competitive policies in any particular case. Their view of
the "regulatory" scheme becomes expansive in the face of competi-
tion; their arguments on both facts and policy can often be highly
technical; and their prediction of the future becomes ominous.
The regulator is asked to use his "expertise" to resolve all these
issues in favor of a noncompetitive solution. This presents an
important practical problem.
II
Charles River Bridge AS A CASE STUDY
The problem can be illustrated by taking a latter day look at a
famous piece of nineteenth century legal history. In 1837, the
United States Supreme Court decided the Charles River Bridge
case. 21 This case involved a competitive challenge to a monopoly
toll bridge between Boston and Charlestown. The facts are quite
simple. The so-called "Charles River Bridge" had been built in
1786 by a private company which had a seventy-year charter
granted by the Massachusetts General Court. For over forty years,
this company enjoyed a monopoly. Then, in 1828, its position was
challenged by an upstart-the so-called "Warren Bridge"--whose
backing company had secured a second charter from a legislature
eager to see lower tolls. The Charles River Bridge Company was of
course outraged at this turn of events, so it went to court to
challenge the Warren Bridge charter. The issue was one of legal
interpretation and constitutional law. Did the Charles River Bridge
charter create an implied contractual right to a monopoly
position?22 No, said the Supreme Court in its celebrated decision;
the rights of private property are to be "sacredly guarded," but the
public interest must control.2 3 Any other construction, said the
Court, would enable the holders of "old feudal grants" for turn-
pikes and ferries to prevent the growth of new methods of
transportation.24
If this old controversy is replayed in contemporary terms, the
21 Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420 (1837).
22 A modern echo of this argument can be seen in the Communications Satellite
Corporation's assertions that the Communications Satellite Act of 1962 (47 U.S.C.
§§ 701-44 (1970)) gave it the exclusive right to offer domestic satellite services. See Comsat
Brief at 7-8, 12-13, Supplemental Brief at 17, 19, In re the Establishment of Domestic
Noncommon Carrier Communication Satellite Facilities by Nongovernmental Entities, 2
F.C.C.2d 668 (1966), second report and order found at 35 F.C.C.2d 844 (1972).
23 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) at 547.
24 Id. at 533.
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case is no longer simple and the legal issues are no longer so clearly
focussed. The Warren Bridge Company is applying for a certificate
of "public interest, convenience, and necessity"2 to build a new
bridge, and the Charles River Bridge Company is still opposing.
The forum is a hearing before the Federal Navigation Commis-
sion, an independent commission charged with broad statutory
responsibility for regulating, inter alia, toll bridge entry and rates.
The Commission has a broad mandate. Under the Federal
Rivers and Harbors Act,26 it must promote the safe and efficient
use of the navigable waters of the United States, "to the end that
safe and efficient transportation over water shall be fully available
to the citizens of the United States at reasonable charges. ' 7 The
original Act was designed to deal with certain local steamboat,
ferry, and barge monopolies which Congress had found were
gouging the public. Accordingly, the Commission was given statu-
tory authority to control entry and pricing among carriers operat-
ing in these fields in such a way as to serve the "public interest,
convenience, and necessity." In due course, the regulated ferries
were being hard-pressed on many river crossings by unregulated
private toll bridges chartered by local governments. In response,
Congress duly enacted the Toll Bridge Amendments, which ex-
panded the Commission's broad authority into this emerging
field.2 The Charles River Bridge proceeding, of course, arises under
the Toll Bridge Amendments.
25 See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 214 (1970). That statute requires FCC approval for adding to or
subtracting from interstate communications plants and facilities. The basic traditional
purpose of such a requirement is to allow the regulatory commission to veto what it regards
as imprudent investment by a regulated monopolist. However, it has been used as a tool to
keep down the level of competitive activity in noncompetitive situations.
26 This statute, and the agency created by it, are, of course, entirely imaginary. Any
resemblance to any existing statute or agency may not necessarily be purely coincidental.
27 Cf. 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1970). The Federal Communications Commission was created
"so as to make available, so far as possible, to all the people of the United States a rapid,
efficient, Nation-wide, and world-wide wire and radio communication service with adequate
facilities at reasonable charges." Id.
28 This is a familiar phenomenon. The parallel to the history of the Interstate Com-
merce Act is obvious. What started as a railroad regulation scheme (Interstate Commerce
Act of 1887, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379 (codified at 49 U.S.C. §§ 1-27 (1970)) was expanded, out
of considerations of regulatory -equity, to cover new modes of transportation, with very
different economic characteristics. This is especially true of the Motor Carrier Act of 1935.
Ch. 498, 49 Stat. 543 (codified as part II of the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C.
§§ 301-27 (1970)). The rationale for this expansion has been explained by the ICC in
Coordination of Motor Transportation: since the railroads are regulated, it is unfair for the
truckers not to he regulated also. 182 i.C.C. 263, 382-92 (1932).
Ultimately, almost every form of surface transportation was brought under the regula-
tory umbrella. Where particular groups, most notably farmers, have had the political clout to
[Vol. 60:159
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The seven-member Commission is a typical administrative
body, with various, diverse past connections to water transporta-
tion. The Chairman is a New Orleans admiralty lawyer who had
been a regional organizer for the President's last political campaign
(he is also reported in the press to be a regular grouse shooting
guest of several steamboat company presidents). The six other
Commissioners are a conservative ex-Congressman who had served
on the House Rivers and Harbors Committee before being de-
feated for re-election four years ago; a retired naval officer, with
an overriding interest in maintaining sufficient inland shipping
facilities to meet the needs of the national defense; a former law
school professor, a self-proclaimed "consumerist" with clear ambi-
tions to run for the Senate from his native state of Ohio; the
retired Executive Secretary of the Northeastern Barge Owners
Association; a former Staff Director for the Senate Rivers and
Harbors Committee; and the Commission's former General Coun-
sel who was the author of the Toll Bridge Amendments.
The Commission is faced with a lively public controversy in the
Charles River Bridge case. The high tolls on the Charles River
Bridge have attracted great public criticism in Boston, and various
politicians and consumer groups have been pressing for a competi-
tive bridge.
Specifically at issue in the proceeding is the Warren Bridge
Company's application for a construction permit to construct a
second span across the Charles River from Boston to Charlestown.
secure exemptions (see 49 U.S.C. § 303(b) (1970)), regulatory efforts have shifted toward
defining the exemptions out of existence. The ICC, for example, long attempted to deny the
agricultural exemption to farm products that had been subject to any processing at all,
giving rise to curious proceedings involving the status of fresh versus iced or frozen poultry,
fruit, and vegetables. See 2 A. KAHN, THE ECONOMicS OF REGULATION 187-91 (1971).
At times an agency charged with regulating one industry has been able, without a new
statute, to extend its jurisdiction effectively to a new industry which has become a competitor.
The usual rationale for such a step is that the agency has "ancillary" authority to protect its
regulatory area from disruptive forces. The best example of this is the FCC's assumption of
direct regulatory authority over the new cable television industry in order to protect its
existing regulatory arrangements for over-the-air television broadcasters. See United States
v. Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649 (1972) (compulsory system design standards and
program organization); United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968)
(barring transmission of district television segments). The cable operators were even re-
quired to pay fees for their "regnlation." National Cable Television Ass'n v. United States,
415 U.S. 336 (1974).
These examples are but particular illustrations of the general point made some 20 years
ago: [R]egulation tends to beget further regulation. For if one industry is regulated then
it may be urged that its competitors should, in fairness, also be regulated.
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMM. TO STUDY THE ANTITRUsT LAWS, REPORT 269 (1955).
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The Warren Bridge Company's application is supported with de-
tailed traffic projections, as well as evidence of its own engineering
and financial capability. Its policy argument is still the same as in
the real case: a second span would promote competition, and
hence lower tolls for travellers between Boston and Charlestown.
The Charles River Bridge Company is still outraged at this
challenge to its long-standing monopoly. It is prepared to meet the
challenge with a vast battalion of lawyers, engineers, accountants,
and economists, armed with a battery of statistics, tables, regression
analyses, and so forth. Its arguments are many and varied, but they
are not original. They do suggest very broad and expansive factual
inquiries into an extensive range of issues. Briefly, these arguments
might be summarized under the following categories.
A. Economic Arguments
To begin with, there are what might be called the "economic"
arguments:
1. "Adequacy of Service." There is no public need for a new
service. Existing bridge facilities are not being fully utilized, and
therefore creation of new capacity would lead to less economic and
efficient use of existing resources.29
2. "Destructive Pricing." Building a second bridge would
create dangerous over-capacity; this would in turn lead to destruc-
tive pricing of bridge tolls and the eventual demise of all bridge
service between Boston and Charlestown. 30
3. "Cream Skimming." Competition on the high-volume,
low-cost, Boston-Charlestown route would undermine the Charles
River Bridge Company's ability to maintain unprofitable, low-
volume bridges upriver .at Cambridge and Watertown.31
29 See Motor Common Carriers of Property, Routes and Service (Petition for Elimina-
tion of Gateways by Rulemaking), 3 CCH 1974 FED. CARR. REP. 36,726. In that case, the
ICC discussed the "virtues" of controlled entry, seeing its role as one which must "assure
dependable motor transportation in a competitive system without the harmful and wasteful
effects of unrestrained random operations." Id. at 36,726.03. Curiously, ICC restrictions
on "back-haul" operations have sought to avoid wasteful activities by requiring a substantial
number of trucks, essentially, to drive about the nation empty. See 2 A. KAHN, supra note 27,
at 182-85.
Interestingly, in the original case, Charles River Bridge, counsel compared the bridge's
average traffic with that of the London Bridge, in order to demonstrate that new entry and
competition would necessarily deprive it of a "property" right. 36 U.S. (I1 Pet.) at 447.
30 See NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF NEGOTIATED COMMISSION
RATES ON THE BROKERAGE INDUSTRY, THE MARKET FOR CORPORATE SECURITIES, AND THE
INVESTING PUBLIC (1968). This report was filed in response to a Securities and Exchange
Commission inquiry. SEC Securities Act Release No. 8239 (Jan. 26, 1968). See also Coordina-
tion of Motor Transportation, 182 I.C.C. 263, 362 (1932) (highway transportation industry
"chronically subject to the depressing effects of excessive competition").
31 See In re Specialized Common Carriers, 29 F.C.C.2d 870, 876 (1971) (assertions of
counsel for AT&T in case involving provision of specialized common carrier services to
[Vol. 60:159
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4. "Economies of Scale." Even if adequate traffic to support
two bridges could be projected in the future, such traffic could be
far more economically provided for by expansion of the existing
bridge system rather than the building of a separate duplicate
span.
32
5. "Full Public Service." If faced with full competition, the
Charles River Bridge would no longer be able to afford to continue
offering special discounts for school children and elderly persons
using the bridge. 33
B. Technical Arguments
There are also "technical" arguments-supported, of course,
by copious engineering testimony:
I. "System Planning." Maintaining a single unified bridge
system is necessary to plan and develop the bridges that will be
required by the next generation of larger wagons.3 4
2. "Service Quality." The proposed Warren Bridge is a struc-
ture falling far short of the high technical standards of the Charles
River Bridge.3 5 It would, at the very least, impose on the public a
higher level of vibration than it was used to.36
limited segments of potential business users); Allocation of Microwave Frequencies above
890 Mc., 27 F.C.C. 359, 368 (1959) (assertions of counsel for AT&T in case involving
frequency band above 890 megacycles).
32 "Bell's watchword has been 'one system, one policy, universal service'
INVESTIGATION OF THE TELEPHONE INDUSTRY IN THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 340,
76th Cong., Ist Sess. 145-46 (1939). Interestingly, the Justice Department commenced an
action against AT&T, seeking to fragment that "one system," despite vociferous economies
of scale arguments. N.Y. Times, Nov. 21, 1974, at 1, col. 6.
33 See NATIONAL ASS'N OF REGULATORY UTILITY COMM'RS, REPORT ON THE ECONOMIC
AND QUALITY OF SERVICE IMPACT RESULTING FROM INTERCONNECTION 11 (1974). But see In re
American Tel. & Tel. ( Seven Way Cost Study), 2 F.C.C.2d 142 (1965).
34 See Letter from J. R. Billingsley, AT&T, to the Chairman, FCC, April 18, 1974. This
letter outlined reasons for AT&T and General Telephone to enter the domestic satellite
area jointly, rather than separately, as originally planned:
[T]echnical discussions have, over time, led each company to conclude that the
public interest would be better served in AF&T and GSAT jointly utilized a single
satellite system rather than two separate systems. This would achieve the
Commission's ohjective in having GSAT increase its participation in the planning of
the interstate network.
Id. (emphasis added).
3' See In re Microwave Communications, Inc., 18 F.C.C.2d 953, 962 (1969) (Commission
rejected established carrier's argument that applicant's lower technical standards provided
justification for rejecting this source of competition). Compare Brief and Proposed Findings
and Conclusions of Bell System Parties, Carterfone, 13 F.C.C.2d 420 (1968). There the
argument was advanced that
[interconnection] would inevitahly result in degradation of service.
It is not too much to say that if interconnection were widely permitted, the
regulated telephone industry could no longer be held responsible for the quality of
service.
Id. at 20, 21.
31 In reviewing an FCC ruling upholding the lawfulness of an AT&T tariff barring use
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3. "Safety." Reduced revenues would compromise the
Charles River Bridge Company's ability to guarantee high mainte-
nance standards and thereby endanger the public.3 7
C. Public Interest Arguments
Finally, there would be a variety of "public interest" or "con-
venience and needs" arguments which would be raised against the
second bridge:
1. "Environmental Injury." The new bridge would com-
promise the scenic beauty of the Charles River,3 8 while endanger-
ing the fish by reducing sunlight and impeding the flow of polluted
waters to the sea.39
2. "Interference with Navigation:" A second bridge would
complicate navigation for ships using the river, thereby raising
risks of injury to seamen and travelers. 40
3. "Balanced Transportation System." Overdevelopment of
the bridges across the Charles might be injurious, and perhaps
even fatal, to the already precarious position of harbor ferrymen,
who are also subject to the Board's jurisdiction and whose services
would be required in time of national emergency when the bridges
were out of service. 41
of a muffling device that could be attached to the mouthpiece on a phone, the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit saw the question as follows:
The question, in the final analysis, is whether the Commission possesses
enough control over the subscriber's use of his telephone to authorize the telephone
company to prevent him from conversing in comparatively low and distorted tones....
[I]ntervenors do not challenge the subscriber's right to seek privacy. They say only
that he should achieve it by cupping his hand between the transmitter and his
mouth and speaking in a low voice into this makeshift muffler. This substitute, we
note, is not less likely to impair intelligibility than the Hush-a-Phone itself .... In
both instances, the paity at the other end of the line hears a comparatively muted
and distorted tone because the subscriber has chosen to use his telephone in a way
that minimizes the risk of being overheard.... The intervenors' tariffs, under the
Commission's decision, are an unwarranted interference with the telephone
subscriber's right reasonably to use his telephone in ways which are privately
beneficial without being publicly detrimental.
Hush-a-Phone Corp. v. United States, 238 F.2d 266, 268 (D.C. Cir. 1956) (emphasis added).
3 See In re Carterphone, 13 F.C.C.2d 430, 435-37 (1967) (hearing examiner's opinion
detailing miscellaneous "dangers").
38 Cf. Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966) (FPC required to weigh, inter alia, impact on scenic values).
39 Cf Udall v. FPC, 387 U.S. 428 (1967). In this case, the FPC was required to weigh the
impact of the construction of a dam on the spawning grounds of various anadromous fish:
The importance of salmon and steelheads in our outdoor life as well as in
commerce is so great that there certainly comes a time when their destruction might
necessitate a halt in so-called "improvement" or "development" of waterways.
Id. at 437.
40 The FCC's refusal to enjoin continued construction of Chicago's Sears Tower, on the
ground it would cause "multiple ghost images" on area television sets was affirmed by the
courts. See Illinois Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC, 467 F.2d 1397 (7th Cir. 1972).
41 See In re American Tel. & Tel., 13 F.C.C.2d 235 (1968) (authorizing new
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4. "Conflicts of Interest." The Warren Bridge Company's
controlling shareholders have a substantial investment in a new
form of transportation-a railway-which is to be built from Bos-
ton to Providence. This interest will cause them to divert capital
and efforts from single-minded development of water-related
transportation.42
This revived Charles River Bridge case sounds quaint. Yet the
legal issues are basically the same as those involved in the original
case. They have merely been revised in the context of the present,
when larger, more modern stakes are involved. Of course, today's
real proceeding would frequently involve more sophisticated tech-
nology, and therefore the "technical" arguments for protection
would be much harder to grasp and resolve.
The revived Charles River Bridge case is quite difficult enough
for the regulatory process. How is even a diligent regulator to
weigh this mixed bag of arguments, involving so many considera-
tions which cannot be readily measured or quantified? Can he do
this in a rational and consistent manner which gives reasonable
guidance for the future? Can it be said, with any assurance, that
the modern regulator would come out with the same result as the
1837 Supreme Court? Clearly, the same type of public interest in
competition as a source of innovation, efficiency, and low toll rates
exists; but today there is no method of objectively weighing these
advantages against the contrary "regulatory" arguments. Thus, the
decision could go either way.43
transatlantic submarine cable rather than enhanced communications satellite usage, even
though cable was probably more costly); In re American Tel. & Tel. (TAT-5), 11 F.C.C.2d
957 (1968). The redundancy of such facilities is frequently explained as necessary to national
defense. In view of the Federal Government's own massive investment in communications
facilities, the need for such redundancy may require reexamination. Cf COMP. GEN., REPORT
ON FEDERAL FREQUENCY MANAGEMENT (Sept. 13, 1974) (Dep't of Treas. B-159895).
42 Cf Investment Co. Institute v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617 (1971) (commercial banking and
collective trust funds under 12 U.S.C. §§ 24, 378(a) (1970)). See also KFKB Broadcasting
Ass'n v. Federal Radio Comm'n, 47 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir. 1931) (patent medicine business and
radio station); In re KISD, Inc., 22 F.C.C.2d 833, 836 (1970) (radio station and dance
promoter); Young People's Ass'n for the Propagation of the Gospel, 6 F.C.C. 178 (1938)
("local religious business" and radio station); United States Transmissions Systems, Inc., FCC
Mimeo No. 74-979 (Sept. 13, 1974) (specialized carrier and equipment manufacturer).
" Even a single regulatory agency sometimes handles basically similar competitive
policy questions differently. For example, the FCC has encouraged competition with
domestic communications common carriers. See, e.g., In re Specialized Common Carrier
Services, 29 F.C.C.2d 870, 902 (1971). Yet it has strongly discouraged competition in the
international communications field. See In re Authorized Entities and Users, 4 F.C.C.2d 421
(1966); In re American Tel. & Tel. (TAT-4), 37 F.C.C. 1151, 1160 (1964). Historically the
SEC has encouraged competition between the New York Stock Exchange and regional
exchanges in NYSE-listed securities. See NYSE Rules, 10 S.E.C. 270 (1941). But it has
discouraged such competition from over-the-counter dealers in the "third market." Cf. The
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What the revived Charles River Bridge case indicates is a need
for a much more structured regulatory inquiry. It shows that the
broad "public interest" inquiry is likely to be more profitable for
the lawyers and expert witnesses than it is for the public.
Moreover, that structure of inquiry must take account of the
political realities which usually surround the regulatory process. It
must assume the existence of a close and continuing community
between the regulators and the regulated, and a great deal of
influence on the part of the regulated firms in the appointment
process. And finally, it must assume that the decision-making body
is more often staffed by ordinary mortals than it is by disinterested
experts or philosopher kings.
III
REGULATORY GOALS AND TOOLS
A tighter statutory structure depends on tighter thinking
about the goals of regulation in a particular industry context. Only
if goals are defined precisely can there ever be legal rules and
institutions which serve those goals. Fuzzy goals will produce fuzzy
legal rules. Of course, goals will vary from sector to sector, but it is
possible to state some general goals, and then discuss the means of
achieving them in the context of the Charles River Bridge proceed-
ing. The following seem to be the most important goals:
1. Economic efficiency is a fundamental goal for almost every
regulatory scheme. With public utility regulation, this is more
commonly stated as a goal of low prices to the public-but what is
really meant is prices based on costs which are themselves prudent
costs. Efficiency can be measured here, as elsewhere, in terms of
the long-run costs of delivering a current offering. In a world of
explosive technology-the age of "future shock"-efficiency can
also be related to the development of cost-reducing methods and
new offerings which the public wants and for which it is willing to
pay.
2. An important goal of common carrier regulation is that the
carrier serve all comers on equal and nondiscriminatory terms.44 A
Economics of Minimum Commission Rates: NYSE Reply to Antitrust Division of Justice
Department, [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 77,707, at 83,618
(1969).
44 Ferrymen, of course, have long been obligated to exercise "due diligence, and
provide suitable means of transportation .... The public grants the exclusive privileges of
ferrying for a consideration ... that the public... shall be crossed at all reasonable hours
without unnecessary delay." Jabine v. Midgett, 25 Ark. 474-76 (1869).
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common carrier, unlike an ordinary businessman, has no general
right to refuse to deal.
3. A related regulatory goal is minimum service reliability.
This dictates that electric power be available when the switch is
turned, that money be in the bank when the depositor stops to
withdraw it. Although often related to common carriage obliga-
tions, it can apply to regulated firms which are not themselves
common carriers.
4. Regulations frequently seek to assure a minimum degree
of honesty and fair dealing among those holding positions of trust.
This rationale supports the regulation of many activities of
financial institutions and fiduciaries. 45
5. Regulation frequently seeks to achieve informed public
choices, by requiring that full disclosure of relevant information be
made. Informed public choice is the basic cornerstone of securities
regulation, 46 and could be the basis of much consumer protection
regulation. 4 '
6. Regulation is frequently designed to protect health, safety,
and the environment. Thus, regulations require air-worthiness
certificates for aircraft,4 8 prior approval for drugs, 49 and com-
pliance with environmental standards. 50 Of course, the reach of
some environmental regulation may extend beyond considerations
of health and safety.
Other goals may exist in particular industries and circum-
stances. For example, the whole premise of broadcast regulation is
that the government must ration a limited resource and thereby
prevent interfering use. 51 But the range of goals given seems
sufficient to illustrate the kind of specific inquiry needed.
Having set forth the goals as precisely as possible, one must
then ask: what are the most efficient ways of achieving them? With
respect to the first goal-namely economic efficiency-the market-
4' See, e.g., Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S. 104 (1911); Engel v. O'Malley, 219
U.S. 128 (1911); SENATE SELECT COMM. ON SMALL BUSINESS, REPORT OF THE FEDERAL
RESERVE SYSTEM ON RECENT CHANGES IN BANKING STRUCTURE IN THE UNITED STATES, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
46 The securities laws have been described as regulation "married to an information
service to produce compulsory publicity." H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 884 (tentative ed. 1958).
47 See, e.g., National Petroleum Ref. Ass'n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 415 U.S. 951 (1974) (upholding rules requiring the posting of gasoline octane
ratings).
48 49 U.S.C. § 1423(c) (1970).
49 21 U.S.C. § 355 (1970).
50 42 U.S.C. § 4332(c)(i) (1970).
51 47 U.S.C. § 301 (1970).
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place generally offers the surest tool. Competition works better
because it operates swiftly, because it rewards skill and innovation,
and because it returns profits to those who produce what the public
wants and considers worth paying for. As already noted, competi-
tion is not a spur in those relatively few "natural monopoly"
situations where the economies of scale are so pervasive that the
market itself dictates a single supplier. In these situations, it is
necessary to rely on traditional public utility regulation as a
"second-best" spur to efficient production of service. However, the
types of situations covered by the natural monopoly rationale for
economic regulation are surprisingly few-being limited essentially
to local distribution of gas, water, electricity, and telephone com-
munications. This means that there is still a very large part of even
the regulated sector where competition can serve as an effective
spur to efficiency and innovation.
The second goal-nondiscriminatory common carriage-is not
necessarily inconsistent with the use of a marketplace approach,
but in fact it has often been used to thwart competitive policies.
The essence of the common carrier principle is that he who serves
must serve everybody on nondiscriminatory terms. In practice, the
key question is often not whether different users are going to be
served at all, but how much they are going to be charged for
service. Nondiscrimination strictly applied would dictate that two
users, or classes, be charged the same price if the cost of serving
them were the same, and that they be charged different prices if
the cost of serving them were different. Regulatory bodies have
frequently thwarted this goal by requiring one class of users to
subsidize the service provided another class.
The remaining goals already outlined-minimum reliability,
honesty, informed choices, and health and environmental
protection-often involve some additional costs, but they generally
do not require detailed, public utility-type regulatory intervention
in commercial decisions.5 2 Therefore, they can generally be ac-
complished without fundamental interference with competitive in-
centives. What is required for them is a set of objective standards
which any potential competitor can try to meet. In other words, the
regulator ceases to be primarily a case-by-case adjudicator of who
52 Environmental issues present perhaps the closest thing to an exception. Some key
environmental .decisions, such as those concerning power plant construction, represent
fundamental economic trade-offs among different interests. Some of them no doubt require
case-by-case adjudication. See, e.g., Udall v. FPC, 387 U.S. 428, 443-44 (1967); Calvert Cliffs
Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
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can compete, and how much he must charge. Rather, he becomes
the promulgator of the terms on which competition is to be
permitted. Regulatory inspection may be necessary to assure com-
pliance, but this does not require detailed control over particular
commercial offerings.
The goal of reform should be to substitute objective standards
for the subjective regulatory judgments normally used in public
utility-type regulation. Thus, for example, a truck or airline
operator would have to have planes or trucks with safety
certificates, would have to treat all customers equally, and perhaps
would have to offer a minimum frequency of service on any route
that he chose to serve. But he would be able to choose his own
routes and prices. Similarly, the goals of honesty and reliability in
the financial sector could be served by having objective standards
for capital and managerial qualifications, combined with adequate
insurance against customer losses. Setting such standards may
eliminate those who cannot meet them-but this is of course
acceptable as long as the standards are necessary and are set by
independent decision-makers based upon an appropriate public
inquiry. And it is certainly a better entry than arbitrary exclusion
by regulators of qualified competitors.
An examination of the hypothetical Charles River Bridge pro-
ceeding in light of this approach demonstrates that more precisely
defined goals would simplify-and improve-the regulatory pro-
cess. First, this approach would suggest that there should be no
statutory rate and entry regulation at all on toll bridges. In other
words, nineteenth century bridge-building, like twentieth century
trucking, is not an activity characterized by such pervasive
economies of scale that it meets any "natural monopoly"
justification for rate and entry regulation. The Warren Bridge
would be allowed to enter if it could meet safety and other design
standards devised to protect the travelling public and navigator.
Even if Commission control over toll bridge entry were re-
tained, its decision-making process could be simplified by a statu-
tory scheme of carefully defined goals. If the statute specifically
provided that the purpose of toll bridge regulation were to assure
safe and efficient transportation at reasonable charges, then the
focus could properly be said to be on protecting the using public,
rather than on protecting competing modes. This would be espe-
cially clear if the statute expressly stated, as it should, that competi-
tion was a preferred way of assuring efficiency. In these circum-
stances, the goal of efficiency would argue strongly for approval of
1975]
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the Warren Bridge's application, on the ground that competition
was the more likely source of innovation and lower rates. Efficiency
would also militate in favor of rejecting the Charles River Bridge's
cross-subsidy arguments of "cream skimming," "full public ser-
vice," and "balanced transportation," because efficiency dictates
that each mode pay ijts own way and that, for example, if bridges
are truly more efficient than ferries, they should be entitled to
realize the full extent of those efficiencies through the competitive
process. If certain public interests are not met through the com-
petitive process-i.e., the interests of school children, senior citi-
zens, and upriver users-efficiency would argue that the Commis-
sion leave these matters to the legislature. Such interests can be
more appropriately tested and more economically taken care of in
the process of open public subsidies than through hidden cross-
subsidies, and the Commission could so find under the statute.
Finally, the "economies of scale" arguments should be rejected on
the ground that if such economies really exist, the marketplace is
bound to resolve the issue. True economies will enable one firm
ultimately to drive the other out of business in an environment of
full price and service competition, and, if they do not, the bridge
users will benefit from continued competition.
The "convenience and needs" arguments, to the extent that
they have merit, could be more appropriately dealt with by estab-
lishing appropriate technical standards for all bridges, rather than
by excluding a new competitor. Thus the Commission could find
under a statutory scheme of carefully defined goals that the
"safety" issue could be disposed of by having minimum structural
design standards for the bridge. The "interference with naviga-
tion" argument could be dealt with by setting appropriate height
and lighting restrictions for bridges on the Charles. Finally, the
"environmental injury" issues would have to be dealt with by the
Commission to comply with the National Environmental Policy
Act, 53 but they seem slight in the context of this example: a second
small wooden bridge is not likely to impair substantially the scenic
value of Boston Harbor or to restrict unduly the tidal flows. The
losses here seem relatively slight compared with the gains to the
bridge-using public of having a competitor to a long-standing
monopoly.
Thus, under a system of carefully defined goals, the Warren
Bridge should be given its construction permit if the Commission
53 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (1970).
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acts in an independent and responsible "way. To say this is not to
say that the Commission will so act. Rather, it expresses the need to
look for ways to try to assure that it will.
IV
STRUCTURED PROCEEDINGS
The ultimate goal should be what one might call "workable
regulation," to assure that the average regulator, with average
regulatory biases, will in fact come out with a satisfactory result in
the typical case. Any particular regulatory scheme may in fact be
administered from time to time by extraordinary and independent
individuals, but that is not the long-run condition of the process;
therefore, regulatory schemes must be designed on the assumption
that it will not be.
The political and psychological realities of regulation must be
considered carefully in devising any scheme of structured regula-
tion, for politics is, and will continue to be, important to the
regulatory process. Particularly ig this true for industries subject to
rate or entry regulation, for here regulation becomes the "bread
and butter" product of those in the industry. Firms in such indus-
tries are keenly interested in who is appointed to supervise them,
and they are frequently able to influence such appointments.
Beyond that, by continued hard advocacy and lobbying, these firms
can often have a disproportionate influence on regulators once
they have been appointed. The reason for this is obvious, and was
precisely identified by a contemporary critic of the operation of the
National Recovery Administration in the early 1930's:
Producers interested in a small range of commodities are more
willing and better able than consumers interested in a wide range
of products to form strong organizations to protect their in-
terests. In particular, they can afford to hire better counsel.54
Thus, regulators are exposed to a constant stream of information
and personal contact from those whom they regulate. In these
circumstances, the regulator can come to equate the industry's
interest wtih public interest.55
14 See A. BuRNs, supra note 20, at 464-65.
11 See generally A. KAHN,supra note 28, at 11-14. Seealso Wall StreetJournal, August 13,
1974, at 34, col. 1. The article makes clear that the CAB's overriding goal is to assure a 12
percent rate of return on air carriers. Indeed, one staff member says that "to [Chairmanl
Timm it's the Holy Grail." Id at col. 2. To this end, the CAB has authorized substantial fare
increases and urged competing carriers to enter into service reduction agreements; it is, as
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The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit described the
situation bluntly in a 1970 opinion implicitly criticizing the SEC's
"passive supervision" of the New York Stock Exchange:
[T]he history of the United States regulatory agencies in general
seems usually to record an ever growing absence of the spirit
required for vigorous enforcement of the antitrust laws. Rather,
it seems to demonstrate that shortly following the establishment
of administrative procedures the regulatory agency usually be-
comes dominated by the industry which it was created to
regulate. 56
Others have made the same point. For example, a 1968
Presidential Commission reported that "[i]n the regulated sector of
the economy, the bias of policy and its enforcement is overwhelm-
ingly against competition .... We believe that this bias is contrary
to the public interest... .,57 This bias reflects the fact that regulated
enterprises generally do not want to compete. Moreover, reg-
ulators generally do not want a "delicate regulatory scheme" ex-
posed to the chance winds of competition and consumer choice.
This history suggests that regulatory agencies should be put on
short statutory leashes when it comes to competition. They should
not be given any unnecessary power to suppress competition. Any
statutory grant should be based on a clearly dqfined need. Political
compromise often results in agencies' being handed the power to
suppress competition without sufficient consideration of the poten-
tial use of that power.5s In fact, the presence of such power invites
its use, if not by the present regulator, by some successor.
one Department of Transportation official put it, "allowing the airlines to quasi-monopolize
themselves." Id. According to the CAB Vice-Chairman, "we have had too much emphasis on
passenger convenience in the past," and the public "must be more tolerant" of fuller planes
even if "somebody has to wait a day to get a flight." Id. at col. 1-2.
56 Thill Sec. Corp. v. New York Stock Exch., 433 F.2d 264, 273 (7th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 401 U.S. 994 (1971). This reasoning supported the court's conclusion that the
antitrust court had jurisdiction over exchange activities subject to the SEC's oversight, and
that the court-not the SEC-should decide the question whether a particular exchange-
imposed restraint was "necessary to make the Exchange Act work" and hence exempt from
antitrust liability under Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
57 PRESIDENT's TASK FORCE, REPORT ON ANTITRUST POuCY (NEA. REPORT) (1968),
reprinted in 115 CONG. REc. 13,890, 13,897 (1969). This is a continuing theme. See
PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE, REPORT ON PRODUCTIVITY AND COMPETITION (STIGLER REPORT)
(1969), reprinted in 5 CCH TRADE REG. REP. 50,408 (1969); ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMM.
REPORT, supra note 28. See also L. KOHLMEIER, THE REGULATORS (1969); Posner, Natural
Monopoly and Its Regulation, 21 STAN. L. REv. 548 (1969); Turner, The Scope of Antitrust and
Other Economic Regulatory Policies, 82 HARV. L. REv. 1207 (1969).
58 This can be illustrated by considering pending legislation aimed at changing current
regulation of the securities industry. Careful factual study and months of hearings by
subcommittees in both houses produced a bill originally introduced in 1973. H.R. 5050, 93d
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Moreover, even when an agency is given some necessary
power to suppress competition in order to meet other defined
statutory goals, it should be required to choose less anticompetitive
options59 and to support anticompetitive decisions by detailed
findings which can be subjected to judicial scrutiny. In the context
of an adversary proceeding, the burden of showing the need to
limit competition should be placed on the party seeking the non-
competitive solution. Sustaining this burden means showing that
the solution is necessary to meet the precisely defined regulatory
goals.6 0 Meeting this burden is important, for the regulated enter-
prise generally has the incentive and resources necessary to raise
Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); see SUBCOMM. ON COMMERCE AND FINANCE OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON
INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, REPORT ON THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY STUDY, H.R.
REP. No. 1519, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972); SUBCOMM. ON SECURITIES OF THE SENATE COMM.
ON BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS, REPORT ON THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY STUDY, S.
Doc. No. 13, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). Both reports recommended elimination of various
anticompetitive restraints, including, among other things, abolition of fixed commission rates
and open access back and forth between the New York Stock Exchange and the "third
market" in NYSE-listed securities. HOUSE SUBCOMM. ON COMMERCE AND FINANCE, REPORT,
supra, at 126-28, 131-46; SENATE SUBCOMM. ON SECURITIES, REPORT, supra, at 43-63, 104-05.
By the time the original bill reflecting these policies came out of full mark-up by the House
subcommittee, however, it had a somewhat different flavor. See H.R. 5050, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess. (1974). Fixed rates were to be abolished by May 1, 1975, the date already set for that
occurrence by the SEC, but the SEC was to have broad power to continue or to reestablish
fixed rates in the future. Id. § 202. Similarly, the Commission was to have broad standby
authority to suppress the "third market" altogether, or to allow continuation of existing stock
exchange restraints on members trading in the "third market." Id. § 205. What is striking
about these provisions is that the overwhelming weight of the testimony before the SEC and
the Congress had been against fixed commission rates and in favor of the "third market" as a
source of competition. Yet the bill, if enacted, would give the SEC open-ended power to
suppress all competition between brokers and between markets. A more pragmatic approach
would suggest that, if such restraints should be necessary in the future, then the Congress
could at that time provide for such restrictions based upon specific facts.
" See United States v. Third Nat'l Bank, 390 U.S. 171, 189 (1968). This important
decision involved the action of a bank regulatory agency in approving an anticompetitive
merger under the so-called "Convenience and Needs" defense to the Bank Merger Act of
1960 as amended (12 U.S.C. § 1828(c) (1970)). The regulator justified its approval on the
grounds that the acquired bank had weak management and that the merger offered one way
of eliminating this problem. The Supreme Court held that this was insufficient, since the
same problem could have been resolved in some other less anticompetitive way-for instance
by hiring independent, new management. The Court held under this statute that the
regulator had to seek the less anticompetitive approach. "Otherwise," said the Court, "the
benefits of competition, acknowledged by Congress, would be sacrificed needlessly." 390 U.S.
at 189 (emphasis added). Although this is a construction of a particular statute, it could be
applied more broadly, as it sometimes has been. See, e.g., Thill Sec. Corp. v. New York Stock
Exch., 433 F.2d 264 (7th Cir. 1970).
60 United States v. Third Nat'l Bank, 390 U.S. 171, 190 (1968) (on requirement of least
anticompetitive solution); United States v. First City Nat'l Bank, 386 U.S. 361, 366 (1967) (on
general burden of proof). See also Federal Maritime Comm'n v. Aktiegolaget Svenska
Amerika Linien (Swedish Am. Line), 390 U.S. 238 (1968) (upholding FMC rule placing
burden of proof on proponent of anticompetitive restraint).
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noncompetitive values. It has detailed information concerning the
operation of the particular system, be it the telephone network, the
stock exchange, or a bank.
Thus, the first step is to structure much more precisely the
agency's inquiry on competitive questions, and to require specific
findings on these. This is a task for the legislature, and it is not an
easy one. But it is necessary if some of the larger competitive
blockages are to be shaken out of the regulatory process.
The second step is to insist on rigorous judicial review of
agency action on such competitive questions. This is important
because the courts are outside the traditional bilateral relationships
that tend to grow up between regulatory agencies and the indus-
tries they regulate. 61 But judicial review is possible only if the
legislature sets down a specific standard for agency action, since the
role of the court is not to substitute its judgment for that of the
agency on open-ended "public interest" issues. The court's role is
to insist that the command of Congress be obeyed-in this case, a
command that full weight be given to competition as a more
effective spur to affirmative action.
The process of effective judicial review can be illustrated by
looking at the 1971 Supreme Court decision in Citizens to Preserve
Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe. 62 Congress had given the Secretary of
Transportation a very specific direction that he was not to permit a
federally financed public highway to run through a public park
"unless (1) there is no feasible and prudent alternative . . .and (2)
such program includes all possible planning to minimize harm to
such park. '6 3 In this case, the Secretary had authorized the build-
ing of an interstate highway right through the middle of a Mem-
phis park, and had made no factual findings to support this
decision. The Secretary argued to the Supreme Court that he had
broad discretion "to engage in a wide-ranging balancing of compet-
ing interests" in selecting a "prudent" route, and that he had done
this in the present case. 64
The Supreme Court unanimously rejected this contention. It
noted that park land was cheaper to acquire because it was already
publicly owned and involved less displacement of existing resi-
dents, and therefore the historic "balancing" process had tended to
result in highway construction through parks.65 The Court stressed
61 See note 19 supra.
62 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
63 49 U.S.C. § 1653(f) (1970).
64 401 U.S. at 411.
15 Id at 412.
[Vol. 60:159
COMPETITION AND REGULATION
the clarity of the congressional mandate: "[T]he very existence of
the statute indicates that the protection of parkland was to be
given paramount importance" and therefore "the Secretary cannot
approve the destruction of park land unless he finds that alterna-
tive routes present unique problems." 66 The Court remanded the
case to the district court with an order to make a "substantial
inquiry" into the whole basis of the Secretary's decision, "based on
the full administrative record that was before the Secretary at the
time he made his decision. 67
This case represents probing, in-depth judicial review. This
type of review is also appropriate in dealing with competitive
questions. Indeed, competition seems much like park land: it is a
publicly acknowledged value which regulators have too often been
willing to dispense with as the easiest way out of any problem.
They should not be permitted to do this. The temptation can be
thwarted by a tough substantive standard plus detailed judicial
review under that standard. 68
CONCLUSION
The practical implications of the type of statute suggested can
be seen by looking a last time at the hypothetical Charles River
Bridge proceeding. This case would now become relatively easy.
The competition-oriented statute would limit the Federal Naviga-
tion Commission's powers over competition to such steps as are
necessary to assure safe and efficient transit at reasonable charges,
66 Id. at 412-13.
67 Id. at 420.
68 A further check upon agency action can be provided by encouraging independent
antitrust suits challenging private conduct even though such conduct may have received
regulatory agency approval. In other words, when private firms submit an anticompetitive
merger or exclusionary agreement to a regulatory agency, they should not be granted
antitrust immunity simply because the agency then approves it. Under present law, such
immunity is generally available for agency approved restraints in transportation (see 49
U.S.C. § 5(11) (1970)), but not in other fields. See, e.g., United States v. Philadelphia Na'l
Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963) (banking); Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341 (1963)
(securities); California v. FPC, 369 U.S. 482 (1962) (natural gas pipelines). This different
treatment seems to be more the result of timing-indeed, some would say accident-than of
any well-thought-out overall scheme. The transportation industries were earliest subject to
antitrust suits, as in Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904), and they were
able to persuade Congress, in each case over 30 years ago, that agency supervision was
adequate protection for the public interest. This is an assumption that has been questioned
in recent years. As a result, other regulated industries, such as broadcasting, banking,
electric power, and securities, brought under antitrust challenge in the last decade or so,
have been unable to obtain straight antitrust exemptions in the wake of Supreme Court
defeats.
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and it would mandate the use of competitive solutions wherever
possible to promote efficiency. The Commission would only have
jurisdiction over maximum toll rates. It would be barred from
rejecting new entry unless it found that (1) new entry involved
significant risk of injury to travelers, shipping, or the environment,
or (2) exclusion of a particular entrant represented the least
anticompetitive way of assuring these statutorily protected in-
terests.
Such a statute would narrow the inquiry greatly. The Warren
Bridge Company would enter the proceeding supported by the
statutory presumption in favor of competition, and the Charles
River Bridge Company would have to show both that its objections
were recognized by the statute and that excluding the Warren
Bridge was the least anticompetitive way of meeting them. This
would be a heavy burden. Most of the Charles River Bridge
Company's economic arguments would be disposed of by the
statute. The cross-subsidies inherent in the "full public service,"
"balanced transportation," and "cream skimming" arguments are
simply inconsistent with the competitive mandate. The "safety" and
"interference with navigation" arguments could be met, as already
indicated, by desigu standards applicable to all bridges on the
Charles-and the Charles River Bridge Company might not wish
to press for too high a general standard! As previously noted, the
"environmental" objections seem relatively slight compared with
the competitive benefits of introducing competition to a long-
standing monopoly.
In sum,- the Charles River Bridge Company would be left with
few arguments with which to prolong a Commission proceeding as
to Warren Bridge and thereby delay its entry.6 9 And the Commis-
sion would be left with relatively little room to dodge the clear
competition-oriented command of the statute. The result would be
a shorter inquiry which would be cheaper for the applicant, more
efficient for the Commission, and, in the long run, advantageous to
the bridge-using public. The fact that it would not be so profitable
to the lawyers and expert witnesses is hardly entitled to great
weight in any net reckoning of the public interest.
69 At times, established firms have used the regulatory process primarily to impose
delay and added costs on potential new entrants in order to deter them from trying to break
into the market. See, e.g., California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unltd., 404 U.S. 508
(1972) (alleging conspiracy to oppose and pursue, without regard to merit, all applications
for trucking certificates by new entrants); L. KOHLMEIER, THE REGULATORS 95-97 (1969)
("Yack Fat" case lockstep response to whimsical tariff filing).
